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Abstract
We determine the effects of a delayed or immediate tax cut with
or without a “sunset” feature in a real customer-market, nonRicar-
dian economy. Our model incorporates both the supply-sider channel,
through which reduced wage income taxes stimulate work effort, as
well as the Feldstein-Rubin-Summers channel, through which cuts in
income tax, in widening the deficit and thus driving up future short
real interest rates, has a chilling effect on present and future invest-
ment, so reducing growth and employment on that account. After
establishing conditions under which fiscal policy is sustainable, we
first show that a delayed tax cut may depress both the real asset price
and employment in the period running up to the implementation of
the tax cut; so this paradox is not restricted to Keynesian or other
monetary models. Second, the same ambiguity may result even if the
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tax cut takes effect immediately. Third, the presence of the para-
doxical result of employment contraction does not work through nor
imply an immediate increase of the long real interest rate, contrary to
financial commentators. Fourth, in the sunset case, the post-sunset
period is characterized unambiguously by depressed asset prices and
decreased employment before recovering to their original levels. Fi-
nally, we point out that a similar analysis applies to the huge pension
problem burdening several continental European economies. So part
of their high unemployment of late may be ascribed to their loom-
ing pension outlays. We conclude, with further argumentation, that
a theory of dynamic markup variation is needed, on top of changes
in marginal tax rates, to quantitatively account for labor-leisure dis-
tortions in the U.S. at medium-term frequencies. Models hamstrung
by pure competition in frictionless markets cannot perform as well as
required. (JEL: E24, E43, E62, F41)
An anti-cyclical policy of regulating tax rates to moderate swings in economic
activity, once advanced by Keynesians and supply-siders alike (Abba Lerner,
1946; Robert Mundell, 1971), faces objections going beyond fine tuning. A
familiar drawback is that a tax-rate cut, in widening the budgetary deficit
(or reducing the surplus) jeopardizes other goals, such as national wealth
accumulation and thus economic growth. A decisive objection, if sustained,
is that, by raising long-term interest rates and real exchange rates, thus cur-
tailing domestic investment and driving customers abroad, a tax cut operates
perversely to contract employment—at least early on, precisely when the aim
is an employment boost. The same objections apply to the claims made in
the present debate over secular fiscal policy. Those who would dispose of
looming budgetary surpluses by the occasional tax cut lest public spending
go on rising in relative terms claim it will have the beneficial side effect of
boosting employment. Those who would instead hold tax rates steady and
wipe out surpluses with the occasional new public program appear to believe
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that their approach would also be a boon to employment—at least not a
drag. But these objections have not been developed very far.
The first argument against the supposition that a cut in tax rates is
expansionary for employment, at least initially, is that by Olivier Blanchard
(1981). He takes up the effect of an “anticipated” fiscal expansion—one that
is announced at t0 and to be implemented at subsequent t1. Such a premise
does not accurately describe tax cuts legislated promptly in response to an
emergency but it does seem to fit very well the more structural kind of tax cut
enacted in the U.S. in the summer of 2001. (This bill, the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA), schedules the largest rate
reductions in the years from about 2005 to 2010, with a “sunset” for these
cuts scheduled for 2011.) Constructing a dynamized version of the Keynesian
closed-economy model, Blanchard shows that in the “bad news” case—and
only in that case—the sudden expectation of the future stimulus drives up
the long rate of interest and causes asset prices to drop correspondingly, with
the result that investment expenditure and output contract in the first phase
of the scenario. However, it would be anomalous to use a model lacking a
natural, or structural, path of unemployment to analyze the effects of a tax
cut reaching full strength some 9 years in the future, like the recent Bush
tax cut, or even 3 years, such as the first Reagan tax cut. We would not
know whether, in a model with a natural rate path, an initial fall of output
might be accompanied by a rise of the natural output path, which would
put a different complexion on the first result. Therefore, when the interval of
study may run for a decade, a model of the effects on the natural rate path
is required. Furthermore, a non-monetary perspective on the matter seems
particularly appropriate for evaluating the claims for back-loaded tax cuts
made by adherents to supply-side analysis, since a natural rate model will
incorporate some or all of the supply-sider effects.
Our analysis incorporates both the supply-sider channel, through which
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reduced wage income taxes stimulate work effort, as well as a channel revived
by Rubin and Summers in the 90’s and earlier championed by Feldstein in
the early 80’s when he was the chairman of the Reagan Council of Economic
Advisors.1 The Feldstein-Rubin-Summers contention was that cutting rates
of income tax, in widening the deficit and thus driving up future short rates
of (real) interest, has a chilling effect on present and future investment, so
reducing growth and employment on that account. They suggested that
this countervailing effect was strong enough to make such tax cutting utterly
perverse—the lower tax rates notwithstanding. We examine this financial hy-
pothesis of a perverse effect from tax cuts in a framework in the structuralist
spirit of Edmund Phelps (1994)—hence non-monetary and inter-generational
though, for simplicity, we exclude unemployment arising from incentive wages
and use instead a variable supply of “hours” that is modeled much like the
demand for consumption.2
Our model describes a closed economy. It is not the Ricardian type of
economy favored by RBC theorists and some public finance theorists. In-
stead, we follow the treatment by Blanchard (1985) in which worker-savers
toil throughout life, save by buying annuities invested in the shares of the
firms, and die off exponentially. In order to provide a business asset to back
the shares of firms, and in order to give a role to the variation of price-
marginal cost markups in explaining the big changes in the wedge between
1For an account of Feldstein’s views, see Feldstein (1993).
2See Robert Hall (1997) for an empirical effort to explain movements of employment
in terms of such a model of labor supply. Our paper makes two main departures from
the Hall framework: We introduce a dynamic theory of variable markups, and we also
introduce a public finance distortion as in Casey Mulligan (2002). We return to a detailed
discussion of the behavior of the markup and the public finance distortion in understanding
key historical episodes in the U.S. in the paper’s concluding section. We argue that a
theory of dynamic markup variation is needed, on top of changes in marginal tax rates, to
quantitatively account for labor-leisure distortions in the U.S. at medium-term frequencies.
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the value marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution in
consumption and leisure (the “marginal value of time” measured in consump-
tion units), we use the customer-market model set up by Phelps and Sidney
Winter (1970) and placed in a general-equilibrium setting by Guillermo Calvo
and Phelps (1983).3 Owing to frictions in the transmission of price informa-
tion, the competition of firms for market share will fail to wipe out all pure
profit, and so leave the optimal price charged by firms hanging above the
average and marginal cost, provided that the current short-term real inter-
est rate is positive. Firms set mark-ups below the monopolist’s level but
above the pure competitor’s level—how high depending upon the value per
unit placed on the average and marginal customer. The output supply and
thus also employment is an increasing function of this per-unit asset value
normalized by dividing it by the exponentially rising productivity parameter
and a decreasing function of the tax rate. Aggregate investment and na-
tional saving here are always zero but we study employment and the other
variables.
This paper will study cuts in the tax rate on wage income that are imme-
diate or delayed and possess or lack a sunset feature. Of course, this focus
is inspired by the Bush tax cut, which would see income tax rates in 2011
go back to their 2000 levels. We find conditions under which fiscal policy
is sustainable—so the debt-income ratio neither explodes nor implodes—
despite a return of income tax rates, from sunset onwards, to their original
rather than higher levels or despite a permanent tax cut. (Despite the pile-
3Rotemberg andWoodford (1992) argued convincingly that a model featuring imperfect
competition in the product market is required in order to explain how aggregate demand
changes, such as increases in government purchases, can increase output while at the
same time raise the real wage. Our paper goes further to argue that fully accounting for
variations in the wedge between the value marginal product of labor and the marginal rate
of substitution in consumption and leisure requires tracking not only changes in the tax
rate but also changes in the price-marginal cost markup.
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up of public debt due to widening budget deficits as a result of income tax
cutting, we show that depressed asset prices drive down the short-term nat-
ural rate of interest thus alleviating the interest burden of debt.) We show
in that case that a delayed tax cut may depress both the real asset price
and employment in the period running up to the implementation of the tax
cut; so this paradox is not restricted to Keynesian or other monetary models,
such as Blanchard’s. Furthermore, we show that the same ambiguity may
result even if the tax cut takes effect immediately. The presence of the para-
doxical result of employment contraction does not work through nor imply
an immediate increase of the long real interest rate, contrary to financial
commentators. Finally, we show in the sunset case that the post-sunset pe-
riod is characterized unambiguously by depressed asset prices and decreased
employment before they recover to their original levels.
Our work here relates to some papers other than those already cited.
Mankiw and Summers (1986) argue on theoretical and empirical grounds
that a tax cut, in increasing households’ disposable income, could raise the
demand for money and, given an unchanged money supply, contract output in
a Keynesian model. As with our comment on the Blanchard (1981) analysis,
a full understanding of the effects of back-loaded tax cuts that kick in in
full force only towards the latter half of the decade requires a treatment of
the natural path of output and employment. Perotti (1999) examines both
theoretically and empirically how drastic cuts in government deficits—fiscal
consolidation—in countries with exceptionally high levels of the dedt-GDP
ratio could lead to consumption booms.4 His paper differs from ours in
neglecting employment responses by assuming perfectly inelastic supplies of
labor, and relies on a competitive framework. Phelps (1992) develops a
4Perotti (1999) also provides a review of the related papers on “expansionary fiscal
consolidations” but these papers do not rely on the supply-sider channels and asset price
channels emphasized in our paper.
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closed-economy customer market model and examines a public debt shock
but it does not incorporate the distortionary effect of the wage income tax
that plays a crucial role in this paper and it neither analyzes the effects of a
back-loaded tax cut nor studies the endogenous evolution of the debt-income
ratio in a fully specified general-equilibrium system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we study the optimization
problems solved by individual agents and set up the basic model. In Section
2, we study the response of asset prices, real interest rates and employment to
an announced future helicopter drop of public debt. We contrast these results
to those obtained under an equivalently-sized “entitlement bomb” scenario.
Section 3 treats the debt-income ratio as an endogenous variable and uses
the full general-equilibrium system to study the economy’s response to shocks
to the wage-income tax rate. In the concluding section, we discuss the role
played by the markup and the public finance distortion in understanding
key historical episodes in the U.S. We also point out that a similar analysis
applies to the huge pension problem burdening several continental European
economies. So part of their high unemployment of late may be ascribed to
their looming pension outlays.
1. The Model
Let us consider a closed economy where investment takes place in “cus-
tomers.” There is one homogeneous good and four marketable assets—
shares, which are titles to the stream of profits, private short- and long-term
bonds issued and held by individuals, and government bonds. These non-
monetary assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes so arbitrage among
them implies that they have the same expected short-term rate of return. It
will be innocuous but convenient to suppose that all (nonhuman) wealth, in
equilibrium, is held in the form of shares and public debt. The economy is
initially in a steady-growth state, growing at the rate λ, with a nonnegative
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public debt-to-productivity ratio (called normalized debt). A proportional
wage income tax is imposed to finance government expenditure.
Agents derive utility from consumption and leisure, have finite lives and
face an instantaneous probability of death θ that is constant throughout
life. Let c(s, t) denote consumption at time t of an agent born at time
s, l(s, t) labor supply, w(s, t) nonhuman wealth, and h(s, t) human wealth.
Also let ys(t) be government entitlement per agent and vh(t) be the real
hourly household wage (in terms of output, our numeraire good), which is
related to the hourly labor cost to the firm, vf , by vf ≡ (1+τ)vh, τ being the
proportional wage income tax rate. We let r(t) denote the real instantaneous
short-term interest rate, ρ the pure rate of time preference, and L¯ the total
time available per worker.
The agent maximizes∫ ∞
t
[log c(s, µ) +B log(L¯− l(s, µ))] exp−(θ+ρ)(µ−t) dµ, B > 0
subject to
dw(s, t)
dt
= [r(t) + θ]w(s, t) + vh(t)l(s, t) + ys(t)− c(s, t)
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indefinitely
into debt. The solution to the agent’s problem is given by
c(s, t) = (θ + ρ)[h(s, t) + w(s, t)],
L¯− l(s, t)
c(s, t)
=
B
vh(t)
,
where human wealth is given by
h(s, t) =
∫ ∞
t
[l(s, µ)vh(µ) + ys(µ)] exp−
∫ µ
t
[r(k)+θ]dk dµ.
Normalizing the population (equal to labor force) to unity, dropping the
time index t and denoting aggregate variables by capital letters, we obtain
C = (θ + ρ)[H +W ],(1)
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L¯− L
C
=
B
vh
,(2)
H˙ = (r + θ)H − (Lvh + ys),(3)
W˙ = rW + Lvh + ys − C,(4)
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. We note from (3) and
(4) that whereas the rate of interest used to discount after-tax wage income
and entitlement is (r + θ), aggregate nonhuman wealth accumulates at rate
r. It is this difference in discount rates that results in the non-neutrality of
debt and deficits.
The government’s budget constraint can, in general, be expressed as
D˙ = rD +G+ ys − τLvh,(5)
where D is the level of government debt, G is the amount of government
purchases, ys is government entitlement, and tax revenue collected is entirely
from wage income taxation. For simplicity, we will throughout set G = 0.
Assuming that, in equilibrium, agents have zero holdings of private bonds,
W ≡ V +D, where V is the total value of shares held by individuals. Taking
the time derivative of (1), and using (3) and (4), we obtain
C˙ = (θ + ρ)[rW + (r + θ)H − C].(6)
Using (1) in (6), we obtain, after re-arrangement of terms,
C˙
C
= (r − ρ)− θ(θ + ρ)[V +D]
C
.(7)
Next, defining C˜ ≡ C/Λ, D˜ ≡ D/Λ, V˜ ≡ V/Λ, y˜s ≡ ys/Λ, and v˜h ≡
vh/Λ, where Λ is the measure of Harrod-neutral productivity level, we can
transform (5) and (7) to obtain
˙˜D = (r − λ)D˜ + y˜s − τLv˜h,(8)
˙˜C = (r − λ− ρ)C˜ − θ(θ + ρ)[V˜ + D˜].(9)
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We can now turn to the firms. With labor as the only factor of produc-
tion, individual firms minimize costs taking wages as given. In the general
equilibrium, however, wages must adjust to equate aggregate labor demand
to aggregate labor supply. Consequently, using (2), unit cost, c¸ ≡ vf/Λ, can
be expressed as
c¸ =
(1 + τ)B(C
s
Λ
)
L¯− (Cs
Λ
)x
,(10)
where x is the stock of customers, and the consumption demand appearing
in (2) has further been equated to the consumption supplied per customer,
Cs, since in the closed economy, the number of customers is equal to the
population, which we have set equal to the size of the labor force. Under
our normalization of the population size to one, x = 1. We can check from
(10) that the partial elasticity of unit cost with respect to Cs is greater than
one. The partial elasticity of the unit cost with respect to x is equal to
L/(L¯ − L). (If we think of a typical eight-hour work day, this is a number
like one-half.) Note also that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the wage income
tax rate increases unit cost, while a rise in the Harrod-neutral productivity
parameter decreases unit cost. We express the unit cost in reduced form as
c¸ = Υ(Cs, x; τ,Λ); ΥCs > 0, Υx > 0, Υτ > 0, ΥΛ < 0.
The firm has to choose the price at which to sell to its current cus-
tomers. Raising its price causes a decrease, and lowering the price an in-
crease, in the quantity demanded by its current customers according to a
per-customer demand relationship, D(pi/p, Cs). For simplicity, we assume
that D(·) is homogeneous of degree one in total sales, Cs, and so we write
Csi = η(pi/p)Cs; η′(pi/p) < 0; η(1) = 1. Each firm chooses the path of its
real price or, equivalently, the path of its supply per customer to its con-
sumers, to maximize the present discounted value of its cash flows. The
maximum at the ith firm is the value of the firm, V i, which depends upon
10
xi:
V i0 ≡ max
∫ ∞
0
[
(
pit
pt
)−Υ(Cst , xt; τ,Λt)
]
η(
pit
pt
)Cst x
i
t exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds dt.
The maximization is subject to the differential equation giving the motion
of the stock of customers of the ith firm as a function of its relative, or real,
price given by (11) below and an initial xi0:
x˙i = g(
pi
p
)xi; g′ < 0, g′′ ≤ 0; g(1) = 0.(11)
The first-order condition for optimal pi is
η(
pi
p
)
Csxi
p
+
[
(
pi
p
)−Υ(Cs, x; τ,Λ)
]
η′(
pi
p
)
Csxi
p
+ qimg
′(
pi
p
)
xi
p
= 0,(12)
where qim is the shadow price, or worth, of an additional customer. Another
two other necessary first-order conditions (which are also sufficient under our
assumptions) from solving the optimal control problem are:
q˙im = [r − g(
pi
p
)]qim −
[
(
pi
p
)−Υ(Cs, x; τ,Λ)
]
η(
pi
p
)Cs,(13)
lim
t→∞ exp
−
∫ t
0
rsds qimtx
i
t = 0.(14)
We note that “marginal q” denoted qim is equal to “average q,” which we
denote as qia ≡ V i/xi, so qim = qia = qi.5
Equating pi to p, and setting qi = q, delivers the condition on consumer-
good supply per firm for product-market equilibrium:[
1 +
η(1)
η′(1)
−Υ(Cs, x; τ,Λ)
]
= −( q
Cs
)
(
g′(1)
η′(1)
)
; η(1) = 1.(15)
5The proof is as follows: Taking the time derivative of the product qimtx
i
t,
we obtain d(qimtx
i
t)/dt = q
i
mt[dx
i
t/dt] + x
i
t[dq
i
mt/dt] = rtq
i
mtx
i
t − [(pit/pt) −
Υ(Cst , xt; τ,Λt)]η(p
i
t/pt)C
s
t x
i
t, after using (11) and (13). Integrating, and using (14), we
obtain qimtxit =
∫∞
t
[(pik/pk)−Υ(Csk, xk; τ,Λk)]η(pik/pk)Cskxik exp−
∫ k
t
rsds dk ≡ V it .
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The expression in the square brackets is the algebraic excess of marginal
revenue over marginal cost, a negative value in customer-market models as
the firm supplies more than called for by the static monopolist’s formula for
maximum current profit, giving up some of the maximum current profit for
the sake of its longer-term interests. An increase in q means that profits from
future customers are high so that each firm reduces its price ( equivalently its
markup) in order to increase its customer base. To handle economic growth,
it is useful to note from (10) that we can express unit cost as c¸ = Υ(C˜s, x; τ),
where C˜s ≡ Cs/Λ, so (15) can be transformed to[
1 +
η(1)
η′(1)
−Υ(C˜s, x; τ)
]
= −( q˜
C˜s
)
(
g′(1)
η′(1)
)
; η(1) = 1,(16)
where q˜ ≡ q/Λ is normalized Q.
From (16), we can express normalized consumer-good supply per cus-
tomer, C˜s, which equals employment, L, in terms of q˜, x, and τ , that
is, C˜s = L = Ω(q˜, x; τ). It is straightforward to show that 0 < eq˜ ≡
d ln C˜s/d ln q˜ < 1, and − 1 < ex ≡ d ln C˜s/d lnx < 0, where ej denotes
the partial elasticity of C˜s with respect to the variable j. Also, Ωτ < 0. An
increase in q˜ makes investment in customers through reducing the markup
attractive and so expands current output and employment. With rising
marginal cost, an increase in the number of customers at each firm leads
to a less than proportionate decline in the amount of (normalized) output
supplied per customer.6 An increase in wage income tax contracts each
firm’s supply. Writing qˆ ≡ q˜/C˜s ≡ q/Cs, we also note that the markup,
m ≡ c¸−1, is a unique decreasing function of qˆ. We express this relationship
as: m ≡ c¸−1 = φ(qˆ); φ′(qˆ) < 0. An increase in investment in customers
through lowering current markups is attractive when the present discounted
value of the future returns from investment (q) are high relative to its cost,
6We use the condition that the partial elasticity of the unit cost with respect to x is
equal to L/(L¯− L), a number typically less than one.
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which depends on the current level of sales (C).
In a symmetric situation across firms, (13) simplifies to
[1−Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)]Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
q˜
+
˙˜q
q˜
+ λ+ g(1) = r; g(1) = 0,(17)
after using x = 1 and C˜s = Ω(q˜, x; τ). Equation (17) in the firm’s instanta-
neous rate of return to investment in its stock of assets, which are customers,
is an inter-temporal condition of capital-market equilibrium: it is entailed by
correct expectations of ˙˜q and r at all future dates. It can be seen from the
unit cost function, Υ(· · ·), in (17) that, given q˜ and x = 1, a decrease in τ
lowers the unit cost directly, and increases it indirectly through raising C˜s.
Using C˜s = Ω(q˜, x; τ) in (16), however, shows that the direct effect domi-
nates so, given q˜, a decrease in τ unambiguously lowers unit cost. In other
words, given that the elasticity of (normalized) output supplied per customer
with respect to q˜ is less than one, ceteris paribus, an increase in q˜ lowers the
markup while a decrease in τ increases the markup. An alternative way of
expressing the markup function will be useful: m ≡ c¸−1 = ψ(q˜; τ); ψq˜ < 0
and ψτ < 0.
Equating consumption demand to consumption supply in (9), and noting
V˜ ≡ q˜x, we obtain an expression for r:
r = λ+ ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(q˜ + D˜)
Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
+ eq˜
(
˙˜q
q˜
)
; 0 < eq˜ < 1,(18)
where we have used x = 1. (If we define the long-term (real) interest rate
as the yield on consols paying a constant coupon flow of unity, and let R be
their yield and hence R−1 be their price, arbitrage between short and long
bonds gives the condition R = r + (R˙/R).) Substituting (18) into (17), and
noting that g(1) = 0, we obtain
[1− eq˜]
˙˜q
q˜
= ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(q˜ + D˜)
Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
− [1−Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)]Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
q˜
.(19)
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It is clear that the full-fledged model makes both q˜ and D˜ endogenous
variables. Before we study the full-fledged model, however, it will be useful,
for purposes of developing intuition, to study (19) treating normalized debt,
D˜, first as a parameter. We proceed with our analysis in this order in the
next two sections.
2. The Analysis Treating Normalized Debt as a Parameter
A. The Debt Bomb Scenario
Suppose that we start off in an initial equilibrium where D˜ = 0, y˜s = 0,
and τ = 0. Then, we have the following lemma:
LEMMA 1: With D˜ = 0, y˜s = 0, and τ = 0, the rational expectations
equilibrium is given by a unique value of q˜ that makes the righthand side of
(19) equal to zero.
Since the elasticity of C˜s with respect to q˜ is less than one, the righthand
side (RHS) of (19) is increasing in q˜. Applying the transversality condition,
limt→∞[exp
−
∫ t
0
(rs−λ)ds q˜txt] = 0, the unique perfect foresight path of q˜ requires
that it be stationary at the value that makes ˙˜q = 0.
Let us now suppose that at t0, it is announced that at t1, there will be
a helicopter drop of public debt, ∆˜ > 0, which will be financed by raising
wage income taxes to cover interest payments on the new constant level of
(normalized) public debt after t1 so that τLv˜h = (r − λ)∆˜. To analyze the
effects on asset prices, interest rates, and employment, it is convenient to refer
to the first panel of Figure 1. Initially, q˜ is equal to q˜A. Working backwards,
let us ask, “What is the value of q˜ in the new stationary state?” (Note that
given the instability of the system, the new stationary state must be attained
precisely at t1.) As we noted above, the unit cost, c¸ ≡ Υ(· · ·), is a monotone
14
increasing function of q˜/C˜s. Substituting that relation into (17), noting
that g(1) = 0, and setting ˙˜q = 0, we obtain a negatively-sloping relationship
relating the LHS of (17) to q˜/C˜s (see Figure 2). Next, turning to (18), setting
˙˜q = 0 and letting D˜ = 0 initially, gives a positively-sloping relationship
relating the RHS of (18) to q˜/C˜s. Now with D˜ = ∆˜ > 0, the positively-
sloping relationship shifts upwards, hence leftwards. The result is that the
value of q˜/C˜s corresponding to the intersection declines. Consequently, the
equilibrium markup is increased, and labor demand is decreased on that
account, at t1.
We have just shown that q˜/C˜s ≡ q˜/Ω(q˜, 1, τ) must fall at t1.7 Given q˜,
an increase in τ reduces C˜s, which would raise q˜/C˜s. Since the elasticity
of C˜s with respect to q˜ is between zero and one, it must be that q˜ falls by
more than proportionately to achieve the implied drop in q˜/C˜s. The new
schedule in Figure 1 relating ˙˜q/q˜ to q˜ must, therefore, be to the left of the
old schedule. As there can only be one initial jump in q˜ at the moment the
announcement is made, i.e. at t0, and the economy must be at the value
of q˜ that makes ˙˜q = 0 at t1 (namely, at q˜C in Figure 1), the path taken by
the economy after the initial jump is given by BC along the old schedule
in Figure 1. Upon receiving the announcement of future fiscal expansion,
therefore, asset prices fall immediately from q˜A to q˜B, and the expected rate
of change of q˜, i.e., the expected capital gains term, goes from zero to a
negative value as market participants form a rational expectation of further
asset price declines. In fact, asset prices continue to decline at an increasing
rate until t1 when ˙˜q jumps up from a negative value (on the old schedule) to
zero (on the new schedule). The stock market value cannot jump at the time
of implementation, t1, to avoid the possibility of making anticipated infinite
7The value of τ that must be raised to finance the interest on debt is given implicitly
by the following equation: τ(1+τ)−1Υ(Ω(q˜C , 1; τ), 1; τ)Ω(q˜C , 1; τ) = [λ+ρ+θ(θ+ρ)(q˜C+
∆˜)(Ω(q˜C , 1; τ))−1]∆˜, where q˜C is the stock market value attained at t1 and shown in Figure
1.
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rates of capital gain or loss. The implied paths taken by the current short-
term real interest rate and employment, which equals normalized output, are
given in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION I: At t0, the short-term real interest rate drops, and it con-
tinues to fall steadily between t0 and t1. Then at t1, it jumps up permanently
to a level higher than the original level. Employment, which equals normal-
ized output, drops at t0, and continues its decline to reach a permanently
lower level at t1.
8
To understand how asset prices affect the natural rate of interest, it is
useful to develop an analytical framework that is very close in spirit to that
used by Lloyd Metzler (1951) in his classic article, “Wealth, saving, and the
rate of interest.” In that paper, Metzler developed a diagram in the (wealth,
interest rate) plane (his Figure 1, p. 101), consisting of an upward-sloping
WW schedule and a downward-sloping AA schedule. The WW schedule,
which Metzler called the wealth-requirements schedule, gives the combina-
tions of the interest rate and the real value of private wealth that would make
“the community’s demand for goods and services as a whole equal [to] its
capacity to produce.” (p. 101) The reasoning underlying his AA schedule
is the following: “In the short run the income earned by the common stock
is a given amount, determined by the fixed supplies of the various agents
of production; and this means that the yield, or the rate of interest, varies
inversely with the real value of the stock.” (p. 101)
We develop in Figure 3 the Metzler diagram in our non-monetary model.
The upward-sloping schedule, WW , gives the amounts of (normalized) pri-
8Notice from the third panel in Figure 1 that there is a further discontinuous drop in
normalized output, and hence employment, at t1. This is because q˜ does not jump at
t1 but wage income tax is increased at that point to finance the interest on debt. The
negative supply-siders’ effect leads to the further decline in employment at t1.
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vate wealth required, at different interest rates and at given ˙˜q/q˜, to make
aggregate demand (here, simply Cd) equal to aggregate supply, Cs, that is,
to attain product-market equilibrium. Since the condition that consumption
demand equals consumption supply, Cd = Cs, holds at each moment, it is
also true that ˙˜C
d
t =
˙˜C
s
t for all t. Moreover, since C˜
s = Ω(q˜, 1; τ), we can write
˙˜C
s
= eq˜[ ˙˜q/q˜]Ω(q˜, 1; τ). From (18), we can express the wealth-requirements
condition as:
W˜ =
[
(r − λ− ρ)− eq˜
(
˙˜q
q˜
)]
Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
θ(θ + ρ)
.(20)
We note that, initially with τ = 0 and D˜ = 0, W˜ ≡ q˜ since x = 1. We can,
therefore, re-express (20) as:
θ(θ + ρ)
[
q˜
Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
]
= (r − λ− ρ)− eq˜
(
˙˜q
q˜
)
,
from which, since the elasticity of C˜s with respect to q˜ is less than one, we
have, for given ˙˜q/q˜, a positive relationship between r and q˜. In Figure 3, the
WW schedule drawn in bold is the initial schedule with τ = 0, D˜ = 0 and
˙˜q/q˜ = 0. The AA schedule, which we can call the assets-market equilibrium
locus, is given in our non-monetary model by (17), which we rewrite here as:
r = λ+
[1−Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)]Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
q˜
+
˙˜q
q˜
.(21)
Since the elasticity of C˜s with respect to q˜ is less than one, we have, for
given ˙˜q/q˜, a negative relationship between r and q˜. The AA schedule drawn
in bold is the initial schedule with τ = 0, D˜ = 0 and ˙˜q/q˜ = 0.
The initial equilibrium corresponds to point 1 in Figure 3, with q˜ equal
to the corresponding q˜A in Figure 1. The sudden announcement at t0 of a
helicopter drop of public debt at t1 causes current r to fall for the following
reason: The expectation of capital loss on the holding of the common stock
requires that current share price, q˜, falls in order to bring the total rate of
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return to holding a share equal to what it was before. Hence, there is a
leftward shift of the AA schedule. The expectation of a capital loss implies
that there is an expectation of a decline in output supplied as well since firms
will be expected to raise their markups on account of the expected fall in q˜.
This serves to raise the wealth requirement for product-market equilibrium,
implying a rightward shift of the WW schedule. The short rate, therefore,
unambiguously falls (see Figure 3). Moreover, the expectation of capital loss
necessarily reduces the equilibrium value of current q˜. To see this, notice
that at a given level of q˜, say at q˜A, a one percentage point decline of ˙˜q/q˜
requires that r falls by eq˜ percent to satisfy the product-market equilibrium
condition, so the WW schedule shifts down by 0 < eq˜ < 1 percent. To
satisfy assets-market equilibrium, however, requires that r falls by exactly
one percent. Since the AA schedule shifts down by more than the WW
schedule, the fall in r corresponding to the movement from point 1 to point
2 in Figure 3 involves a fall of q˜ from q˜A to q˜B.
As the rate of expected capital loss further rises between t0 and t1 (see
the first panel of Figure 1), both the WW and AA schedules continue to
shift down, with the latter curve shifting by more than the former, thereby
generating further declines in r and q˜. At t1, with ˙˜q/q˜ going from a negative
value to zero, the AA schedule shifts back to its original position (the bold
line). The wealth-requirements schedule, however, does not go back to its
original position, as wealth now includes also the holding of public debt,
∆˜ > 0. A horizontal wedge, of size ∆˜ > 0, is now driven between the AA
and WW schedules with the consequence that the short rate at t1 onwards
(corresponding to point 3 in Figure 3) is above the original short rate. We
plot the time path of r in the second panel of Figure 1, where we see that the
short-term real interest rate first drops at t0 and continues a path of steady
decline between t0 and t1 before it jumps up to a plateau that is higher than
the level attained before the shock.
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The path of normalized output, hence employment, can be inferred from
the output supply function, C˜s = Ω(q˜, 1; τ). Since q˜ drops at t0 and continues
its decline until t1, industry markups first increase and continue to increase
further until t1. As a result, employment first contracts and continues to
decline until t1. At t1, although q˜ does not jump, the imposition of the
wage income tax causes a further contraction in normalized output. Hence
employment, though falling steadily since t0 as asset prices steadily decline,
suffers a discontinuous drop at t1 due to the supply-sider effect of higher wage
income taxes imposed at that time.
It is worth pointing out that since the short rate, r, initially drops and
continues to fall (until t1) in response to the news of a future helicopter drop
of public debt, the depressed stock market could be accompanied by an initial
decline in the long rate, R. Recall that arbitrage ensures R = r + (R˙/R). If
the term structure is downward sloping at announcement, R unambiguously
falls below r since R˙/R < 0. We depict an illustrative path (dotted line) in
the second panel in Figure 1 denoted RI . If the term structure is upward
sloping at announcement so R˙/R > 0, it is still possible that R initially drops
if r falls by more than the rate of capital loss on holding a long bond, where
R−1 is the price of the long-term bond. We depict another illustrative path
(broken line) in the second panel in Figure 1 denoted RII . Hence observing
an initial fall in the long rate is not prima facie evidence against the Feldstein-
Rubin-Summers channel, going from prospective debt to higher future short
rates and a decline in asset prices and employment, contrary to financial
commentators.9
Intuitively, the slump in the stock market that follows the announcement
of future fiscal expansion can be explained as follows: A lower value of equity
in the future is required to make the rate of return in equity investment
9See the editorial entitled, “The Demise of Rubinomics,” in the Wall Street Journal
(August 28, 2002).
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equal to the higher short rate in the future. Under rational expectation,
this anticipation drives down equity prices today. The current drop in stock
market value reduces nonhuman wealth, which reduces current consumption
demand, and puts downward pressure on the current short rate. Despite
lower short rates, and notwithstanding lower long rates, economic activity is
not stimulated since the decline in stock market reflects the reduced worth of
a future customer and that is decisive in driving firms to raise their current
markups. Current output and employment are, therefore, depressed.10
The expectation of the higher short rate from t1 onwards is, however, only
one channel causing the slump in asset prices. Since the debt bomb explosion
occurring at t1 has the effect thereafter of requiring an increase of tax rates
to re-balance the budget, now swollen by the increased debt burden, the vf
curve, hence the cost curve, is pushed up with the result that quasi-rent is
reduced beginning at t1. The anticipation of this reduced level of aggregate
quasi-rents on the customer stock is another factor causing an immediate
drop in the stock market at t0.
11
10We have demonstrated theoretically that the decline in asset prices coincides with
an initial decline in the short-term natural rate of interest. Is this relationship observed
empirically? Do we tend to see, say, in the past fifteen years, a decline in the stock market
being associated with a decline in the short-term real interest rate, and a booming stock
market associated with an increase in the short-term real interest rate. We suggest that
the answer is in the affirmative. A number of authors who have examined the behavior
of the Federal Reserve System since the mid-eighties onwards have argued that implicit
inflation targeting by the Fed has involved raising the short-term real interest rate as a
means of dampening aggregate demand when asset prices increased (see Ben Bernanke
and Mark Gertler, 1999; Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Gertler, 2000). When stock
prices declined in 2001, the Fed lowered the short-term real interest rate in a series of cuts
to stimulate aggregate demand.
11Mundell (1960) showed that when the corporate income tax is raised to finance interest
on debt, the capitalization of the tax, hence a drop of the current real asset price, acts to
reduce wealth even as increased private holding of public debt increases wealth. He pointed
out that the Metzler (1951) analysis regarding public debt failed to take into account this
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B. The Entitlement Bomb Scenario
Republicans may complain that the Democrats’ alternative to the debt
bomb, a rain of increased entitlement spending, which in our stylized model
also commences in the medium-future, has the same effect. They are right
up to a point: The increased spending, in requiring thereafter an increase
of tax rates for budget balance, also reduces quasi-rents and as a result the
stock market also drops in anticipation of that. (In fact, the Republicans
would justify their debt bomb as a second-best move serving to ward off the
worse outcome of increased entitlements.)
The economics is more complicated, however, since the debt bomb im-
pacts on the stock market and hence investment and employment through a
second channel—higher expected future short rates from t1 onwards—which
the rain of entitlements does not. With the Blanchard-Yaari demographics,
the debt bomb is converted to an annuity by individuals so that in expected
value sense the whole stream of interest in perpetuity is expected to be con-
sumed. So there is a bigger stimulus to consumption than that imparted by
an equal-sized “entitlement bomb” in our non-Ricardian setup.12 (There is
offsetting capitalization effect. Metzler (1973) objected that corporate taxes were not a
substantial part of total taxes collected in the U.S. Our analysis, however, shows that the
asset market also capitalizes the effects of higher expected wage income taxes required to
finance the interest on debt.
12Suppose that the government announces that it will introduce a steady stream of wel-
fare entitlements at t1 onwards such that y˜s = (rD1 −λ)∆˜, where rD1 is the short rate that
prevails from t1 onwards in the debt bomb scenario. Human wealth at t0 is not changed
by the welfare entitlement program and is given simply by
∫∞
t0
v˜ft Lt exp
−
∫ µ
t0
(rk−λ+θ)dk
dµ
since what the government gives in quasi-human wealth, viz. the entitlement bene-
fit (the normalized entitlement’s value doesn’t grow at r(t) − λ, but at r(t) − λ + θ),
is taken away in taxes on labor. The human wealth under the debt bomb scenario,
however, has an additional term, which disappears only under Ricardian Equivalence:
Ht0 =
∫∞
t0
v˜ft Lt exp
−
∫ µ
t0
(rk−λ+θ)dk
dµ+[ θy˜
s
(rD1 −λ)(rD1 −λ+θ)
] exp
−
∫ t1
t0
(rk−λ+θ)dk. Therefore, in
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also a larger implied rise in demand for leisure under the debt bomb scenario.
Using (2), and noting that vh ≡ (1 + τ)−1vf and m ≡ c¸−1 = (vf/Λ)−1, we
have (L¯ − L)/C˜ = B(1 + τ)m. The greater stimulus to consumption, C˜,
carries with it a greater increase in demand for leisure, given the terms on
the righthand side. Additionally, there is a greater increase in the current
markup as well, so there is also a larger increase in the demand for leisure
relative to consumption under the debt bomb scenario.) Consequently, from
t1 onwards, the short rate path corresponding to the debt bomb scenario
lies everywhere above the short rate path corresponding to the entitlement
bomb scenario. (Under the entitlement bomb scenario, the short rate from
t1 onwards is back to its t0 level attained before receiving the news.
13) The
result is that there is a bigger drop in the stock market at t0 under the debt
bomb scenario, and accordingly, a larger increase in industry markup, and
a sharper decline in employment at t0. The stronger contractionary effect
of the debt bomb does not vanish in the long run. We have the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION II: Suppose that an announcement is made at t0 that at t1
onwards, there will be a constant flow of welfare entitlements (equal in value
to the interest on debt in the alternative scenario) given to all workers alike,
and financed by wage income taxation. Between t0 and t1, the short-term
interest rate declines. At t1, it jumps back up to the original level. Although
normalized output, which equals employment, jumps down at t0, and con-
tinues its decline to reach a permanently lower level at t1, the employment
path lies everywhere above the path under the debt bomb scenario.
our non-Ricardian economy, consumers feel more wealthy under the debt bomb scenario
than under an equal-sized “entitlement bomb”.
13Under the entitlement bomb scenario, use of Figure 2 with D˜ = 0 shows that the value
q˜/C˜s ≡ q˜/Ω(q˜, 1; τ) is unaffected in the new stationary state, which the economy must
attain at t1. Using (18) and noting that ˙˜q = 0 at t1 imply that r1 = r0.
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3. The Analysis Treating Normalized Debt as Endogenous
A. Conditions for Fiscal Sustainability
The preceding analysis showed how an anticipated helicopter drop of pub-
lic debt, accompanied by an expected increase in wage income taxes required
to finance the interest on debt, leads to a drop in asset prices today through
two channels: An increase in future short rates of real interest as well as
an expectation of reduced future aggregate quasi-rents on the stock of cus-
tomers due to the anticipated higher wage income taxes, which raise unit
costs. However, the tax bill passed in the summer of 2001 (the EGTRRA),
in fact, sets the post-sunset tax rate back to its original rather than to a
higher level without any planned spending cuts. Indeed, the Republicans
are proposing making the tax cuts permanent. This immediately raises the
question of whether the proposed fiscal changes are sustainable in the sense
that the debt-income ratio will neither explode nor implode when account
is taken of all the general-equilibrium effects (see Blanchard, et al. (1990)
for the concept of the sustainability of fiscal policy). We will show that, in
our model, fiscal sustainability requires that, for a given tax rate, the pri-
mary (non-interest) surplus must be made a sufficiently responsive positive
function of the debt-income ratio. Conversely, the primary deficit must be
reduced sufficiently as the debt-income ratio rises in order to achieve fiscal
sustainablity. The extent to which policy-makers must reduce the primary
(non-interest) deficit, such as through cutting government entitlement pro-
grams, depends upon how much a decrease in asset prices decreases tax rev-
enue (relative to income) compared to how much it lowers the real interest
rate (net of GDP growth) and the resultant public debt service burden. In
a recent study, Bohn [1998], in fact, found significant evidence that for the
U.S. the primary surplus (taken as a ratio to GDP) is indeed an increasing
function of the debt-GDP ratio (after controlling for war-time spending and
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cyclical fluctuations) for 1916-1995 and various subperiods. His estimates of
the increase in (non-interest) primary surplus in response to a unit increase
in the debt-income ratio range from 0.028 to 0.054 for various sub-periods,
with 0.054 for the whole period.
The full-fledged general-equilibrium model in q˜ and D˜ can be summarized
by a pair of equations, namely, (19) and an additional equation describing
the evolution of (normalized) debt:
˙˜D = { 1
1− eq˜ [ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(q˜ + D˜)
Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
]
−( eq˜
1− eq˜ )
[1−Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)]Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
q˜
}D˜
+ y˜s − ( τ
1 + τ
)Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)Ω(q˜, 1; τ),(22)
where the terms r − λ and τLv˜h in (8) have been replaced using
r − λ = 1
1− eq˜ [ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(q˜ + D˜)
Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
]
−( eq˜
1− eq˜ )
[1−Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)]Ω(q˜, 1; τ)
q˜
,
τLv˜h = (
τ
1 + τ
)Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ)Ω(q˜, 1; τ).
Instead of studying the system described by (19) and (22), it turns out to
be convenient to examine a related system where asset price, q, and debt, D,
are normalized by GDP rather than by the productivity measure. Defining
then Dˆ ≡ D˜/C˜s and yˆs ≡ y˜s/C˜s, and using our notation qˆ ≡ q˜/C˜s introduced
earlier, we modify (19) and (22) to yield
˙ˆq
qˆ
= µ(qˆ, Dˆ)− [1− (φ(qˆ))
−1]
qˆ
,(23)
˙ˆ
D = µ(qˆ, Dˆ)Dˆ + yˆs − Tˆ (qˆ; τ),(24)
where r − λ − eq˜[ ˙˜q/q˜] = ρ + θ(θ + ρ)[qˆ + Dˆ] ≡ µ(qˆ, Dˆ), which gives the
interest net of GDP growth. We see that it is increasing in qˆ and Dˆ so
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µqˆ > 0 and µDˆ > 0. Note also that the tax revenue to GDP ratio is given
by τ(1 + τ)−1Υ(Ω(q˜, 1; τ), 1; τ) = τ(1 + τ)−1(φ(qˆ))−1 ≡ Tˆ (qˆ; τ); Tˆqˆ > 0,
Tˆτ > 0. To obtain (23) and (24), we have also used the relationships ˙ˆq/qˆ ≡
[1− eq˜]( ˙˜q/q˜), m ≡ c¸−1 = φ(qˆ) and qˆ ≡ q˜/Ω(q˜, 1; τ).
To find the condition for fiscal sustainablity, we first take note that if the
primary surplus (normalized by GDP) given by Tˆ − yˆs, where Tˆ ≡ τ(1 +
τ)−1(φ(qˆ))−1 is independent of the debt-GDP ratio, Dˆ, the steady state of the
linearized system given by (23) and (24) is globally unstable so any deviation
from the steady state will cause the debt-income ratio to either explode or
implode. Technically, the trace of the 2 × 2 matrix associated with the
linearized dynamic system given below is positive, and the determinant is
also positive:
[ ˙ˆq
˙ˆ
D]′ = A[qˆ − qˆss Dˆ − Dˆss]′,(25)
where [· · ·]′ denotes a column vector, the system (23) and (24) is linearized
around the steady-state values, qˆss and Dˆss, and the 2× 2 matrix A contains
the following elements:
a11 ≡ µ+ µqˆ qˆss − (φ(qˆss))−2φ′(qˆss),
a12 ≡ µDˆqˆss,
a21 ≡ µqˆDˆss − Tˆqˆ,
a22 ≡ µ+ µDˆDˆss.
We can readily check that a11 > 0, a12 > 0 and a22 > 0 while a21 can either
be positive or negative. (Consequently, the trace of A (tr(A)) is clearly
positive.) The sign of a21 depends upon the relative influence of a change
in qˆ on the tax-GDP ratio on the one hand, and the interest debt burden
on the other hand. If a rise in the asset price relative to GDP raises the
tax-GDP ratio by more than it raises the interest burden (normalized by
GDP) so a booming stock market leads to declining debt-income ratios or,
conversely, a depressed stock market leads to rising debt-income ratios, then
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a21 is negative, and the determinant of A (det(A)), equal to a11a22 − a21a12,
is clearly positive. In the alternative case when a21 is positive, we can check
that (a22/a21) > (a12/a11) so once again the determinant of A is positive.
More concretely, we can show that, whether a21 > 0 or a21 < 0, we obtain
det(A) ≡ µµqˆ qˆss+µDˆqˆssTˆqˆ+[µ−(φ′/φ2)][µDˆDˆss+µ] > 0 since µqˆ > 0, µDˆ > 0,
Tˆqˆ > 0 and φ
′ < 0. Therefore, if the entitlement spending (taken as a ratio
to GDP) is held invariant to changes in the debt-GDP ratio, the system
is globally unstable. Any deviation from the steady-state of the system is
bound to lead to either imploding or exploding debt (as a ratio to GDP).
To achieve fiscal sustainability, it is necessary that we make the (normal-
ized) primary surplus an increasing function of Dˆ, as suggested by the em-
pirical work of Bohn [1998], so we let entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP
decline as the debt-income ratio increases and write yˆs = Φ(Dˆ); Φ′(Dˆ) < 0
since we want to keep τ as a policy parameter. With entitlement spending
as a ratio to GDP made a negative function of the debt-income ratio, we
have to modify the original value of a22 to get a22 ≡ µ + µDˆDˆss + ΦDˆ. In
the arguably empirically relevant case where a depressed stock market leads
to rising debt-income ratios so a21 < 0, we find that in order to achieve
saddle-path stability, it will be necessary though not sufficient for yˆs to fall
in response to an increase in Dˆ so that a22 is negative. In other words, a unit
increase in the debt-income ratio necessitates a cut in entitlement spending
(relative to GDP) that more than offsets the rise in interest burden so that
the debt-income ratio actually declines. The necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for saddle-path stability, and hence fiscal sustainability in response to a
tax cut, in the case when a21 < 0 is for −(a22) > −a21(a12/a11) > 0. Noting
that we can write down the respective slopes of the
˙ˆ
D = 0 and ˙ˆq = 0 loci as:
dqˆ
dDˆ
∣∣∣∣∣ ˙ˆ
D
=
−[µDˆ + (µ/Dˆss) + Dˆ−1ss ΦDˆ]
µqˆ − (Tˆqˆ/Dˆss)
≡ −a22
a21
,(26)
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dqˆ
dDˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
˙ˆq
=
−µDˆ
µq˜ + qˆ−1ss [µ− (φ(qˆss))−2φ′(qˆss)]
≡ −a12
a11
< 0,(27)
we obtain saddle-path stability only if both stationary loci are negatively
sloped in such a way that ∣∣∣∣∣ dq˜dDˆ
∣∣∣∣∣ ˙ˆ
D
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dq˜dDˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
˙˜q
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
We show this case in Figure 4.
If a decline in asset prices (relative to GDP) leads to bigger cost savings
for the government (as a result of a huge drop in interest debt service burden)
than its loss of tax revenue (relative to GDP) so a21 > 0, then the condition
for fiscal sustainability is immediately satisfied by a fiscal rule that makes yˆs
fall sufficiently in response to a rise in Dˆ to make a22 negative. (Referring
to (26) and (27), this condition says that when a21 > 0 and a22 < 0, we
are assured of saddle-path stability and the stationary locus for
˙ˆ
D = 0 is
positively sloped in the (Dˆ, qˆ) plane.) If a21 > 0, the condition that a22 <
0 is sufficient for fiscal sustainability but it is not necessary. If declining
asset prices lead to a smaller loss in tax revenue (relative to GDP) than the
government can save from a decline in interest burden so the debt-income
ratio actually falls, then, in order to attain fiscal sustainability, big cuts in
entitlement spending may not be required when the debt-income ratio rises
so a22 remains positive so long as the condition 0 < a22 < a21(a12/a11) is
satisfied. Referring to (26) and (27), this condition says that when a21 >
0 and a22 > 0, we obtain saddle-path stability if both stationary loci are
negatively sloped in such a way that∣∣∣∣∣ dq˜dDˆ
∣∣∣∣∣ ˙ˆ
D
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣∣ dq˜dDˆ
∣∣∣∣∣
˙˜q
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
In summary, there are three cases where we obtain saddle-path stability.
If a drop in qˆ leads to a greater loss in tax revenue (relative to GDP) than
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cost savings from a lower interest debt service burden so a21 < 0, the only
way to achieve saddle-path stability is to cut entitlement spending (relative
to GDP) sharply enough to make not only a22 < 0 but also to satisfy the
condition: −a22 > −a21(a12/a11) > 0. However, if a drop in qˆ leads to greater
interest cost savings for the government than the amount of tax revenue lost
(relative to GDP), saddle-path stability is guaranteed for a government that
cuts entitlement spending (relative to GDP) sufficiently to make a22 < 0.
In this case, we have a21 > 0 and a22 < 0 so det(A) is unambiguously neg-
ative. If a21 > 0, the government can, in fact, attain fiscal sustainability
without sharp cuts to entitlement spending (relative to GDP) so long as
0 < a22 < a21(a12/a11). Letting γ1 = [tr(A) −
√
tr(A)2 − 4det(A)]/2 be the
negative root, the slope of the saddle path is given by (γ1 − a11)/a12, which
is unambiguously negative in all the three cases summarized here. The inter-
ested reader can proceed to draw the relevant phase diagrams corresponding
to the two cases where a drop in qˆ leads to larger interest cost savings for
the government than the tax revenue lost (relative to GDP). It is readily
checked that the qualitative results regarding the effects on asset prices and
employment of the tax shocks we study are similar in all three cases. The
differences occur in the short-term movement of the debt-income ratio in
response to asset price changes since, at any given Dˆ, a fall of qˆ leads to a
gradual buildup of the debt-income ratio when a21 ≡ µqˆDˆss − Tˆqˆ < 0 but to
a gradual decrease of the debt-income ratio when a21 ≡ µqˆDˆss − Tˆqˆ > 0. We
will, however, proceed to conduct our analysis with the aid of Figure 4 and
so focus on the case where a21 ≡ µqˆDˆss − Tˆqˆ < 0.
B. Effects of Tax Cuts
We now establish three propositions in the case of sustainable fiscal ex-
pansion.
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PROPOSITION III: Suppose that the economy is initially in a steady state
with (Dˆ0, qˆ0). At t0, there is an announcement that at t1, the wage income
tax rate will be cut from τ to τ ′ until t2, at which time the tax rate reverts
back to τ . Output and employment can either expand (“good news” case)
or contract (“bad news” case) from t0 to t2. The same ambiguity may result
even if the tax cut takes place immediately. From t2 onwards, however,
employment and output are unambiguously depressed relative to the original
steady state, to which they gradually recover in both scenarios, whether the
tax cut is delayed or immediate.
In Figure 5, we depict the “bad news” case, where the prospective tax
cut leads to an immediate decline in qˆ from point A to point B at t0, and
continues to fall further from point B to point C, which it reaches at t1, the
time of implementation.14 At t1, both the asset price as well as the level
of debt cannot jump but the tax cut itself leads to an increase in output
supply, which causes qˆ ≡ q˜/Ω(q˜, 1; τ) and Dˆ ≡ D˜/Ω(q˜, 1; τ) to drop equipro-
portionately so moving from point C to point D along the ray OX. Between
t1 and t2, qˆ continues to fall along the path DE. At sunset, that is, at t2,
once again the asset price and the level of debt cannot jump but now, the
restoration of the tax rate back to its original level prompts a fall in output
supply, which raises qˆ and Dˆ equiproportionately so moving from point E
to point F along the ray OY . Point F lies at the intersection of ray OY
and the saddle path associated with the initial steady-state point A. The
bad-news case is one where the Feldstein-Rubin-Summers effect dominates
so normalized output, which equals employment, declines during the interval
t0 to t1. At t1, the wage income tax rate is cut, and that has a positive
supply-sider effect. What is clear is that at t2, Q normalized by GDP is
14Note that at t0, the level of debt does not jump while the fall in asset price in the
“bad news” case leads to a fall in output so the debt-GDP ratio rises. Consequently, point
B lies south-east of point A.
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lower than the initial qˆ0, and there is no offsetting reduced wage income tax
so employment, and hence normalized output, is unambiguously depressed
below its pre-announcement level. Gradually, employment and (normalized)
asset prices recover back to their original steady-state levels. Figure 6 depicts
the “good news” case where the economy initially experiences an expansion.
Even in this case, however, employment is depressed from sunset onwards
(traveling along FA) until the economy finally recovers back to its original
steady state.
Notice that in the “bad news” case, the debt-GDP ratio rises between
the announcement and implementation as depressed asset prices lead to a
larger loss in tax revenues than the cost saving from lower interest brought
about by a depressed stock market. This is not so in the “good news” case,
where a booming stock market increases tax revenues by more than enough
to offset increased debt service burden resulting from upward pressure on the
real interest rate.
Bringing forward the tax cut so that t1 coincides with t0, that is, an
immediate tax cut, would, in Figure 5, bring about a sharper drop in qˆ
(to point B′) but the contractionary effect on employment on that account
would immediately be offset by the positive supply-sider effect of reduced
wage income taxes. This does not alter our result that from t2 onwards,
asset prices are depressed with correspondingly reduced economic activity.
A similar argument applies to the “good news” case.
We can also readily establish the following proposition:
PROPOSITION IV: Making the tax cut permanent, whether it is delayed
or immediate, leaves the real asset price (normalized by GDP) permanently
depressed notwithstanding the positive supply-sider effect so employment
could either contract or expand in the long run.
The new steady state is represented by point G in Figure 5 (the “bad
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news” case) and Figure 6 (the “good news” case) exhibiting lower Q (nor-
malized by GDP) and higher debt-GDP ratio so it is possible in both cases
for employment to contract in the long run despite lower tax rates. The
interested reader can infer the whole path of employment in response to this
shock using the phase-diagram analysis.
Finally, tax cut advocates might argue that the Feldstein-Rubin-Summers
effect of depressed asset prices on account of higher future short rates would
be weakened by a higher trend growth in output. The next proposition shows
that the equilibrium of our closed-economy model is independent of the trend
growth rate, λ.
PROPOSITION V: Suppose that the economy is initially in a steady state
with (Dˆ0, qˆ0), and a trend growth rate of λ. Let the trend growth rate
suddenly increase to λ′. The equilibrium described by (Dˆ0, qˆ0) is unaffected.
The result is evident from inspecting (23) and (24), where we see that
the general equilibrium system is independent of λ. In effect, in our closed
economy, a sudden rise in the trend growth rate is immediately translated
into an equal increase in the natural rate of interest so the interest burden
of debt is not reduced as a result of higher growth.
4. Concluding Remarks
The supply-siders’ thesis that employment activity is predominantly driven
by changes in the tax wedge is empirically not the great success that is
widely supposed. Mulligan (2002) attempts to establish the part played by
public finance distortion in the movements of the supply of labor of Amer-
ican workers over nearly a century, 1889-1996, using the familiar neoclas-
sical model of labor-leisure choice. This leads to the first-order condition
MRS(C, L¯ − L) = vh, where MRS is the marginal value of time, which is
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a function of consumption C and hours worked L, and vh is the after-tax
hourly wage. The latter is related to the firms’ demand wage vf and to the
wage income tax rate τ by vh ≡ (1 + τ)−1vf and, invoking pure competi-
tion, vf is equated to the marginal product of labor, MPL. Consequently,
MRS(C, L¯ − L) = (1 + τ)−1MPL.15 Mulligan argues from his empirical
exercise that marginal tax rates are well correlated with labor-leisure distor-
tions at low frequencies, but they cannot explain the distortions during the
Great Depression, the Second World War and the 1980s. He concludes that
the within-decade aggregate fluctuations in consumption, wages, and labor
supply are hard to reconcile with this simple competitive equilibrium model
of labor supply and demand.
The present paper brings in a product-market distortion arising from
the gradual diffusion of information about prices, which gives firms some
monopoly power, at least transiently. The firms’ inter-temporal perspec-
tive makes their current markup m inversely related to q˜, the (normalized)
shadow price that firms attach to a customer, and also an inverse function of
the wage income tax rate τ , m = ψ(q˜; τ); ψq˜ < 0 and ψτ < 0. In this imper-
fectly competitive framework the analogue to Mulligan’s labor-equilibrium
relationship is MRS(C, L¯− L) = (1 + τ)−1[ψ(q˜; τ)]−1MPL, in which an in-
crease of q˜ pulls up the right-hand side (i.e., vh) and thus induces an increase
in hours supplied. Expressing the wedge between the MPL and MRS as
MPL/MRS = (1 + τ)[ψ(q˜; τ)], notice that, given q˜, an increase of τ in-
creases the wedge through the (1+ τ) term but decreases the wedge through
the markup term. Because of these two offsetting effects of a change in τ on
15In principle, the consumption tax rate, say τc, also appears on the right-hand side, so
MRS(C, L¯−L) = [(1− τc)/(1 + τ)]MPL. However, with the assumed functional form in
Mulligan (2002) as well as in our paper, it is possible to write MRS(C/(1− τc), L¯−L) =
(1+τ)−1MPL, so that when the measure of consumption used is inclusive of consumption
taxes, we do not expect consumption taxes to drive a wedge between measured MRS and
MPL.
32
the wedge, one cannot expect to understand well the medium-term responses
of employment (here hours) to wage income tax changes without considering
the asset price responses to such shocks.16 For example, in our framework,
an increase in the tax rates introduced in the mid-1990s under the Clin-
ton administration may have helped to boost employment, contrary to what
would be predicted by Mulligan’s competitive equilibrium framework, pre-
cisely because the expectation of a decline in the debt-GDP ratio boosted
asset prices and thus reduced firms’ markups. The Feldstein-Rubin-Summers
channel, from tax increase to the demand for labor, through which a pay-
down of the public debt (relative to income) lowers future short rates and
elevates asset prices, including the shadow price of customers, q˜, could have
pulled up vh and L more than the contractionary supply-sider effect from the
increase of τ pushed them down. Reduced nonhuman wealth, on account of
the shrinking public debt, would further act to depress consumption demand,
and along with it, demand for leisure.
We believe that our framework, by introducing a role for asset prices in
the fundamental labor-equilibrium condition, also helps to throw light on
some puzzles found by Mulligan in his study of labor-leisure distortions at
medium-term frequencies within the competitive equilibrium framework. For
example, he found that tax distortions alone could not quantitatively explain
the wedge between MRS and MPL during the Great Depression. “What
16With a utility function such as logC + [B/(1 − η−1)](L¯ − L)1−η−1 , where η−1 gives
the constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of leisure, an increase in the wedge
given by (1 + τ)m brings about a smaller increase in the demand for leisure at any given
level of consumption demand the smaller η−1 is. Hall (1997) uses the value η−1 = 0.6 in
his numerical simulation while Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) use η−1 = 1.3 in their
baseline simulation. The latter cite studies showing that estimated values of the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution of leisure for males are typically near zero while many
studies obtain estimates for female workers that fall within the range 0.5-1.5 with two
being the upper bound. Our theoretical model in the text assumes η−1 = 1 as also is done
by Prescott (2002) in his Ely lecture.
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drove a 40% wedge between marginal product and value of time?” he asks.
In our model, MPL/MRS(C, L¯ − L) = (1 + τ)[ψ(q˜; τ)], so we conjecture
that the increase of the wedge during 1929-33 that cannot be explained by
an increase in tax rate is attributable to a decline in asset prices, such as a
depressed value placed on a customer, which increases firms’ markups. (The
recent paper by Chari, et al. (2002) similarly fails to incorporate a role
for asset prices in explaining the wedge between MRS and MPL during
the Great Depression. By using a perfectly competitive framework, hence
giving no role for markup adjustments, any shifts in expectations that change
current asset prices cannot affect this particular wedge. In their model, as
well as in the models of Mulligan (2002) and Prescott (2002), this wedge is
termed an intra-temporal wedge. Our framework, however, makes this an
inter-temporal wedge because shifts in expectations can change it even when
current marginal tax rates are unchanged.)
Mulligan also found that despite an increase in federal tax rates from
practically zero to more than 20% during World War II, leisure during the
second world war is lower than implied by the labor-equilibrium condition
given by the competitive equilibrium model. Our model suggests that this
may be attributable to the fact, highlighted by Mankiw (1985), that the
real interest rate was low during the war. Theoretically, the low wartime
real interest rate can be explained either by Mankiw’s own introduction of
consumer durables into the standard neoclassical growth model or by the
introduction of the differences in relative labor intensiveness in the consumer
and capital-good producing sectors (see Phelps, 1994). In the former case,
an increase in government spending on the aggregative good, which drives
capital used in the domestic sector into the commercial sector so reducing
the marginal product of capital, and in the latter case, an increase in govern-
ment spending on the relatively labor-intensive capital good, reduces the real
interest rate, and raises asset prices, including the shadow prices firms place
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on their operating business assets, such as their customers. This counteracts
the distortionary effects of increased federal income tax rates.17
Finally, Mulligan pointed out that the falling wedge during the Reagan
years could not be fully explained by the decrease in federal labor income
tax rates in the 80s. Although the Feldstein-Rubin-Summers channel would
imply that the stock market should decline if agents formed expectations of
a build-up of public debt, authors such as Blanchard and Summers (1984)
have argued that in the early eighties, the fiscal expansion in the U.S. was
offset by the fiscal contraction in the other major OECD countries so that the
aggregate inflation-adjusted deficit as a percent of the group’s GNP did not
change significantly. They pointed to the strong stock market performance
in the 1980s and the strong behavior of investment in the face of increased
real interest rates as evidence of a favorable shift in expected profitability. If
that inference is correct, the consequent rise in the value placed on customers
would cause markups to fall, and thus reduce the wedge beyond what was
brought about by reduced wage income tax rates.
While the focus in our paper has been on tax cuts, it is easy to see how we
can apply a similar framework to the study of the effects on asset prices and
employment of the looming pension problem burdening several continental
European economies. For example, a burgeoning gap between future pen-
sion outlays and tax revenues resulting from increasing life expectancy of the
population, so the number of retirees rises relative to the number of workers,
would require an increase in the payroll tax rate at some point in the future
if public debt is not to grow unboundedly. The expectation of a build-up
of public debt as pension liabilities increase would have a Feldstein-Rubin-
17Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) adduce evidence in support of a decline in markups
when government purchases increase, including during the two world wars, but they use a
different model of dynamic markups from ours. They also acknowledge that the imposition
of price controls during World War II places a limitation on one’s interpretation of the
data.
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Summers effect of depressing current asset prices and contracting employ-
ment. When payroll taxes are ultimately increased to ensure fiscal solvency,
the vf curve, hence the cost curve, will shift up and reduce quasi-rent from
that time onwards. The anticipation of reduced aggregate quasi-rents on the
future stock of customers will lead to a decline of asset prices today. For
this reason as well, firms are led to raise their current markups and contract
employment.
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